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Abstract  This  study  analyzes  the  effect  that  certain  characteristics  of  board  of  directors  in
Spanish non-listed  family  ﬁrms  have  on  performance.  The  results  of  a  hierarchical  regression
analysis on  a  database  of  544  ﬁrms  show  a  negative  effect  of  a  higher  proportion  of  executive
directors and  a  positive  effect  of  CEO  duality.  No  effects  were  found  in  relation  to  the  diversity
of family  directors  (executive  or  non-executive).  In  relation  to  the  effect  of  outside  boards,  the
inﬂuence on  performance  is  negative  except  when  this  variable  was  considered  in  interactionPrivate  family  ﬁrm;
Board  of  directors;
Performance
with CEO  duality.  In  this  case,  the  effect  on  performance  was  positive.
© 2013  ACEDE.  Published  by  Elsevier  España,  S.L.U.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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aIntroduction
General  literature  on  boards  of  directors  includes  numerous
studies  that  attempt  to  identify  the  effect  of  certain  varia-
bles  related  to  the  composition  of  the  board  of  directors
on  company  performance  (for  some  recent  contributions
see  Dalton  and  Dalton,  2011;  Finegold  et  al.,  2007;  Kiel
and  Nicholson,  2007).  However,  few  studies  have  dealt  with
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(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).oards  of  directors  in  family  ﬁrms  (Bettinelli,  2011;  Uhlaner
t  al.,  2007b).  The  review  of  the  literature  on  boards  and
amily  ﬁrms  shows  that  most  empirical  literature  uses  data
f  public  family  ﬁrms  (e.g.  Anderson  and  Reeb,  2004;  Braun
nd  Sharma,  2007;  Chen  and  Hsu,  2009;  García-Ramos  and
arcía-Olalla,  2011a,b;  Lam  and  Lee,  2007;  Leung  et  al.,
014;  Prabowo  and  Simpson,  2011;  San  Martin-Reyna  and
uran-Encalada,  2012)  or  uses  combined  samples  of  private
nd  public  family  ﬁrms  (e.g.  Oswald  et  al.,  2009).  From
he  scant  literature  that  focuses  on  boards  in  private  fam-
ly  ﬁrms,  some  papers  analyze  the  factors  that  determine
 speciﬁc  board  composition  (e.g.  Bammens  et  al.,  2008;
askiewicz  and  Klein,  2007;  Voordeckers  et  al.,  2007)  and
ewer  studies  speciﬁcally  analyze  the  relationship  between
oard  composition  and  performance  (e.g.,  Arosa  et  al.,
010;  Maseda  et  al.,  2014;  Schulze  et  al.,  2001;  Westhead
is is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
2a
e
a
l
a
i
a
(
s
f
f
g
a
a
e
h
n
t
a
a
2
t
t
p
p
n
i
h
o
e
(
1
s
i
T
o
e
b
i
e
b
ﬁ
w
i
r
l
s
t
i
d
i
i
t
o
p
C
i
t
i
i
t
t
a
a
o
i
M
t
t
v
a
t
b
e
m
t
G
f
e
m
a
o
b
i
t
t
v
i
ﬁ
c
o
q
a
b
p
t
c
e
f
T
T
p
O
b
d
p
t
c14  
nd  Howorth,  2006).  Appendix  1  presents  an  overview  of  the
mpirical  studies  on  the  relationship  of  board  composition
nd  performance  in  family  ﬁrms.
Previous  research  has  obtained  mixed  results  when  ana-
yzing  the  link  between  board  composition  and  performance,
nd  this  link  is  especially  unclear  in  the  case  of  private  fam-
ly  ﬁrms  (Maseda  et  al.,  2014).  However,  boards  can  have
 signiﬁcant  role  in  the  performance  of  non-listed  ﬁrms
Voordeckers  et  al.,  2007),  and  could  prevent  failure  in  a
igniﬁcant  number  of  them  (Bammens  et  al.,  2008).  There-
ore,  it  is  important  to  study  the  function  of  boards  in  private
amily  ﬁrms,  so  that  the  ﬁndings  and  recommendations  of
eneral  studies  on  governance  can  be  better  deﬁned  and
dapted  to  this  speciﬁc  type  of  organization  (Bartholomeusz
nd  Tanewski,  2006;  Chen  and  Nowland,  2010;  Chrisman
t  al.,  2009;  Uhlaner  et  al.,  2007a).
The  literature  on  boards  of  directors  in  family  businesses
ighlight  that  the  two  main  tasks  of  the  board,  as  an  inter-
al  administrative  body,  are  the  exercise  of  control  and
he  provision  of  advice  (Bammens  et  al.,  2011) with  agency
nd  stewardship  theories  being  the  two  main  theoretical
pproaches  (Bammens  et  al.,  2011;  Benavides-Velasco  et  al.,
011).
The  exercise  of  control  is  based  on  the  principles  of
he  agency  theory.  From  this  point  of  view  the  aim  of
he  board  of  directors  is  to  mitigate  the  moral  hazard
roblems  speciﬁc  to  family  ﬁrms.  The  sources  of  these
roblems  are:  the  owning-family’s  pursuit  of  its  own  eco-
omic  and/or  non-economic  interests  thereby  harming  the
nterests  of  non-family  stakeholders  (mainly  minority  share-
olders);  the  parents’  altruism  and  the  associated  problems
f  self-control;  and  the  intra-family  divergence  of  inter-
sts  associated  to  the  generational  evolution  of  the  ﬁrms
Bammens  et  al.,  2011).
However,  according  to  stewardship  theory  (Davis  et  al.,
997)  decision-makers  can  show  certain  psychological  and
ituational  factors  such  as  strong  ﬁrm  identiﬁcation  and
nvolvement,  and  needs  for  personal  and  social  fulﬁllment.
hese  motivations  can  lead  decision-makers  to  show  pro-
rganization  behavior  and  not  the  opportunistic  behavior
xplained  in  the  agency  theory  and,  therefore,  the  main
oard’s  task  is  to  support  and  advise  the  management
nstead  of  controlling  them  (Bammens  et  al.,  2011).
On  these  bases,  the  aim  of  this  study  is  to  provide  new
vidence  on  the  scarcely  researched  relationship  between
oard  composition  and  performance  in  non-listed  family
rms,  focusing  on  the  special  features  of  these  ﬁrms.  Thus
e  argue  that  stewardship  behavior  and  psychosocial  altru-
sm  (as  opposed  to  asymmetric  altruism  and  the  agency
elated  problems  of  self-control)  are  more  likely  in  non-
isted  family  ﬁrms  than  in  their  listed  counterparts.  These
pecial  features  are  expected  to  have  an  inﬂuence  on  the
asks  of  the  board  in  private  family  ﬁrms,  and  therefore  on
ts  composition.
Concretely,  we  analyzed  the  proportion  of  executive
irectors  and  CEO  duality.  These  issues  are  usually  addressed
n  general  research  on  board  composition  but  barely  studied
n  family  ﬁrms,  especially  in  non-listed  ones.  This  is  a  gap  in
he  literature  because  there  is  evidence  that  the  presence
f  executive  directors  and  the  existence  of  CEO  duality  are
articularly  high  in  private  family  ﬁrms.  (Arosa  et  al.,  2010;
abrera-Suárez  and  Santana-Martín,  2004)  and  therefore  it
a
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s  important  to  analyze  the  consequences  on  performance  of
hese  special  features.  We  also  analyze  the  diversity  of  fam-
ly  directors  (executive  and  non-executive).  This  variable
s  considered  to  be  relevant  when  studying  board  composi-
ion  in  private  family  ﬁrms  because  it  can  be  expected  that
he  majority  of  directors  in  these  ﬁrms  are  family  members
nd  that  differences  between  them  may  derive  in  speciﬁc
gency  problems.  The  literature  addressing  the  problem
f  intrafamily  divergence  of  interest  has  suggested  analyz-
ng  this  aspect  which  has  not  been  empirically  studied  yet.
oreover,  we  have  addressed  the  issue  of  independence  of
he  board  in  terms  of  the  majority  presence  of  outside  direc-
ors,  that  is,  non-executive  and  non-family  directors.  The
ariable  related  to  board  independence  has  received  a  great
mount  of  attention  in  general  literature  on  boards  and  it  is
he  most  addressed  variable  by  the  few  articles  focusing  on
oards  in  private  family  ﬁrms  (see  Appendix  1).  Even  though
mpirical  evidence  is  not  conclusive,  it  seems  that  recom-
endation  on  good  governance  tends  to  support  the  idea
hat  outside  boards  are  more  efﬁcient  (García-Ramos  and
arcía-Olalla,  2011a).  However,  this  may  not  be  the  case
or  family  ﬁrms,  and  especially  for  non-listed  ones  (Arosa
t  al.,  2010).  The  inﬂuence  of  outside  boards  on  perfor-
ance  has  been  analyzed  in  this  study  both  in  general  and
lso  in  interaction  with  CEO  duality  and  with  the  diversity
f  family  directors.
In  order  to  reach  these  goals,  a  speciﬁc  database  has
een  created  for  this  study  which  includes  544  private  fam-
ly  ﬁrms.  Among  others,  we  have  obtained  data  related  to
he  composition  of  the  boards  distinguishing  the  different
ypes  of  directors  (executives  versus  non-executives,  family
ersus  non-family).  As  far  as  we  know  this  is  the  ﬁrst  study
ncluding  such  kind  of  data  about  the  boards  in  private  family
rms.
The  study  is  structured  as  follows.  Firstly,  the  theoreti-
al  framework  begins  with  a  discussion  of  the  special  nature
f  the  private  family  ﬁrm.  Then,  the  analysis  of  the  conse-
uences  of  these  special  features  on  the  roles  of  the  board
nd  on  its  composition  allows  the  hypotheses  of  the  study  to
e  proposed.  Secondly,  the  methodology  used  to  obtain  and
rocess  the  data  and  deﬁne  the  variables  is  outlined.  After
he  results  are  presented,  the  ﬁnal  section  presents  the  main
onclusions  drawn  from  the  discussion  of  the  results  and
stablishes  the  limitations  of  the  study,  making  suggestions
or  future  research.
heory and hypotheses
he  private  family  ﬁrm:  stewardship  and
sychosocial  altruism
ur  line  of  argument,  and  consequently  our  hypotheses,  is
ased  on  the  premise  that  private  family  ﬁrms  possess  more
eﬁning  characteristics  of  the  essence  of  family  ﬁrms  than
ublic  family  ﬁrms.  Thus,  private  family  ﬁrms  correspond
o  what  the  literature  considers  typical  family  ﬁrms,  with  a
oncentrated  shareholder  base  and  family  member  insiders
ctive  in  management  and  the  board  (Lane  et  al.,  2006).
Privately  held  family  businesses  are  often  used  as  vehicles
or  sustaining  the  family’s  transgenerational  economic  and
ocio-emotional  needs  (Bammens  et  al.,  2011;  García-Ramos
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and  García-Olalla,  2011b).  Families  are  actively  involved  not
only  in  ownership,  but  also  in  the  management  of  the  ﬁrm
(Sciascia  and  Mazzola,  2008;  Westhead  and  Howorth,  2006).
Thus,  family  ties  and  relationships  have  a  great  inﬂuence
in  the  functioning  of  the  ﬁrm  (Miller  et  al.,  2007).  On  the
contrary,  listed  ﬁrms  will  include  non-family  owners  that
will  want  to  play  an  active  role  in  the  governance  of  the
ﬁrms  and  in  the  decision-making  process,  probably  wanting
to  impose  economic  and  ﬁnancial  criteria  over  psychosocial
criteria.  Listed  family  ﬁrms  are  subjected  to  other  pressures
and  conditioning  factors  over  and  above  fulﬁlling  the  inter-
ests,  aspirations  and  the  approach  of  the  family  (Bammens
et  al.,  2011;  Combs,  2008;  Dyer,  1986).  Also,  when  numerous
non-family  members  have  ownership  in  the  ﬁrm  the  intimacy
and  ease  of  communication  that  are  often  present  in  family
ﬁrms  may  be  damaged  (O’Boyle  et  al.,  2012).
Non-listed  family  ﬁrms  are  probably  smaller  than  their
listed  counterparts,  and  this  size  difference  is  reﬂected  both
in  the  ﬁrm  and  the  family.  Smaller  family  ﬁrms  could  prob-
ably  have  stronger  family  ties  that  could  aid  in  developing
certain  advantages  in  terms  of  social  capital  (Arregle  et  al.,
2007;  Hoffman  et  al.,  2006;  Pearson  et  al.,  2008).  A  strong
family  social  capital  provides  closure  that  ensures  family
members  and  other  employees  perform  within  established
social  norms  (Danes  et  al.,  2009;  Hoffman  et  al.,  2006).
High-intensity  ties  and  strong  bonds  between  group  (family)
members  can  act  to  encourage  reliability  and  transparency
which  enhance  the  capacity  of  the  group  to  control  member
behavior  and  compliance  with  the  group’s  norms  (Björnberg
and  Nicholson,  2007;  Calabrò  and  Mussolino,  2011;  Long
and  Mathews,  2011;  Salvato  and  Melin,  2008).  Thus,  strong
bonds  encourage  family  members  to  create  conditions  con-
ducive  to  ethical  behavior  in  the  ﬁrm  (Kidwell  et  al.,  2012).
Also,  social  capital  can  enable  family  ﬁrms  easier  access  to
valuable  resources  and  capacities  such  as  better  customer
service,  long-standing  relationship  with  other  stakeholders,
and  a  high  level  of  goodwill  (Kowalewski  et  al.,  2010).
Thus,  family  members  in  smaller  private  family  ﬁrms  may
have  a  higher  propensity  to  display  stewardship  behaviors
(Le  Breton-Miller  et  al.,  2011;  Miller  et  al.,  2008;  O’Boyle
et  al.,  2012).  The  main  assumptions  of  stewardship  theory
(Davis  et  al.,  1997)  support  the  idea  that  executive  behav-
ior  may  be  motivated  by  the  general  interests  of  a  ﬁrm
and  not  only  by  the  private  interests  of  executives.  Thus,
owner-managers  of  privately  held  family  ﬁrms  often  use
their  ﬁrms  as  vehicles  for  sustaining  the  family’s  transgen-
erational  economic  and  socio-emotional  needs.  However,  in
publicly  traded  family  ﬁrms,  where  there  is  a  higher  dis-
tance  between  the  family  and  the  ﬁrm,  the  family  incentive
to  exploit  rather  than  nurture  the  business  becomes  stronger
(Bammens  et  al.,  2011;  Miller  et  al.,  2008).
Similarly,  these  elements  associated  to  social  capital  and
stewardship  attitudes  can  also  be  linked  to  the  concept
of  psychosocial  altruism  mentioned  by  Lubatkin  et  al.
(2007).  This  type  of  altruism  is  based  on  the  predisposi-
tion  of  parents  to  transmit  their  offspring  a  set  of  socially
embedded  values  and  norms  to  enable  their  psychologi-
cal  and  social  development.  These  values  and  norms  are
transferred  through  mimetic  and  normative  forms  of  inﬂu-
ence  (socialization).  This  generates  dynamics  of  reciprocity
and  interdependence  which  strengthen  family  bonds  and
improve  communication  between  family  members.  These
ﬁ
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ynamics  help  transmit  the  ﬁrm’s  story,  identity  and  lan-
uage.  This  type  of  altruism  encourages  feelings  of  loyalty
nd  trust  between  family  members,  facilitates  communica-
ion  and  lengthens  the  decision-making  time  frame,  all  of
hich  ultimately  reduces  agency  costs  (Bartholomeusz  and
anewski,  2006;  Benavides-Velasco  et  al.,  2011;  Karra  et  al.,
006;  Mun˜oz-Bullon  and  Sánchez-Bueno,  2012;  Sciascia  and
azzola,  2008).
Private  family  ﬁrms  tend  to  show  stewardship  behav-
or  and  psychosocial  altruism.  This  could  help  explain  why
his  type  of  family  ﬁrm  often  relies  on  informal  social  con-
rols  (relational  governance)  rather  than  on  contractual
overnance.  Dynamics  such  as  trust,  shared  vision  and  com-
itment  to  the  ﬁrm  play  a fundamental  role  (Calabrò  and
ussolino,  2011;  Uhlaner  et  al.,  2007a).  These  speciﬁc  gov-
rnance  characteristics  of  private  family  ﬁrms  are  expected
o  inﬂuence  board  composition  and  management.  In  the  fol-
owing  paragraphs  we  will  develop  the  arguments  based  on
 set  of  relevant  variables  and  propose  our  hypotheses.
he  role  of  executive  directors
rom  a  classical  agency  theory  perspective,  the  presence
f  executive  directors  in  the  board  could  compromise  the
oard’s  correct  supervision  of  management  teams.  The
anagement  team  (the  agents)  could  make  decisions  to
heir  own  advantage  rather  than  in  the  interests  of  company
wners  (the  principals)  (Fama  and  Jensen,  1983;  Jensen  and
eckling,  1976).  Therefore,  a  greater  presence  of  execu-
ives  on  the  board  could  negatively  affect  this  supervisory
ole  and,  ultimately,  company  performance.
However,  the  supervisory  role  of  the  board  may  not  be
he  most  important  in  private  family  ﬁrms  where  there  is  a
trong  presence  of  family  members  in  management  teams
nd  board  of  directors  (Cabrera-Suárez  and  Santana-Martín,
004;  Dyer,  1986;  Lane  et  al.,  2006;  Lubatkin  et  al.,  2005;
aseda  et  al.,  2014).  Thus  there  is  a  high  level  of  correspon-
ence  between  managers  and  company  owners.  This  means
hat  the  classical  agency  problem  related  to  divergence
f  interests  between  principal  and  agent  loses  relevance
Chrisman  et  al.,  2004;  García-Ramos  and  García-Olalla,
011a).
On  a  similar  vein,  the  problem  of  power  abuse  and
xtraction  of  private  beneﬁts  at  the  expense  of  non-family
inority  shareholders,  that  is  common  in  public  family  ﬁrms
Bammens  et  al.,  2011;  Kowalewski  et  al.,  2010;  Le  Breton-
iller  et  al.,  2011),  may  not  affect  private  family  ﬁrms,
s  the  presence  of  non-family  shareholders  in  these  ﬁrms
s  unlikely  (Cabrera-Suárez  and  Santana-Martín,  2004;  Dyer,
986;  Lane  et  al.,  2006;  Lubatkin  et  al.,  2005).  In  private
amily  ﬁrms  where  family  control  is  overwhelming  there
re  more  incentives  to  care  for  the  business  that  is  to  be
otivated  by  stewardship  behavior,  than  to  exploit  their
ersonal  property  (Kowalewski  et  al.,  2010;  Le  Breton-Miller
t  al.,  2011).  Thus  speciﬁc  agency  problems  associated  with
elf-control  of  family  owner-managers  are  likely  to  be  less
mportant.  Then,  regarding  the  supervisory  role,  the  pres-rms  does  not  have  to  cause  any  effects  on  performance.
However,  the  task  of  providing  advice  is  especially  rele-
ant  when  relationships  are  based  on  stewardship  attitudes.
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rom  this  point  of  view  the  board’s  main  task  is  to  counsel
tewards  (executives)  in  their  pro-organizational  endeavors
Davis  et  al.,  1997),  complementing  the  knowledge  of  mana-
ement  teams  (Bammens  et  al.,  2011).  In  private  family
rms  decisions  on  promotion  toward  managerial  positions
re  likely  to  be  based  more  on  kinship  criteria  than  on  pro-
essional  criteria  related  to  capability  and  suitability  for
he  position  (de  Kok  et  al.,  2006).  This  is  because  family
irectors  are  considered  a  better  option  to  preserve  the  val-
es,  culture  and  socioemotional  wealth  of  the  family  ﬁrm
Gomez-Mejia  et  al.,  2011).  Executive  directors  have  more
n-depth,  speciﬁc  knowledge  of  the  ﬁrm,  but  they  may  lack
eneral  business  knowledge  normally  acquired  at  univer-
ity  and  from  previous  experience  outside  the  family  ﬁrm
Bammens  et  al.,  2011).  Thus,  private  family  ﬁrms  can  be
specially  vulnerable  to  deﬁcits  of  expertise  because  they
ften  have  self-imposed  personnel  selection  criterion  that
ives  preferential  or  even  exclusive  consideration  to  fam-
ly  stakeholders  (Chrisman  et  al.,  2004).  This  can  limit  the
trategic  options  considered  by  the  board,  as  well  as  the
epth  and  quality  of  contributions  to  the  assessment  and  dis-
ussion  of  the  ﬁrm’s  strategic  alternatives  (Bammens  et  al.,
008;  Brunninge  et  al.,  2007;  Johannisson  and  Huse,  2000;  Le
reton-Miller  et  al.,  2011;  Mun˜oz-Bullon  and  Sánchez-Bueno,
012;  Voordeckers  et  al.,  2007).  Therefore,  the  following
ypothesis  can  be  proposed:
1.  In  non-listed  family  ﬁrms,  a  higher  proportion  of
xecutive  directors  on  the  board  will  negatively  affect  per-
ormance.
uality  in  the  position  of  chief  executive
EO  duality  occurs  when  the  position  of  chief  executive  in
 ﬁrm  is  held  by  the  same  person  who  serves  as  chair  of
he  board  of  directors  (Dalton  et  al.,  1998).  The  literature
ncludes  controversy  as  to  whether  this  circumstance  has
ositive  and/or  negative  consequences  on  decision  making
nd  company  performance.  In  fact,  this  debate  has  been
revalent  in  literature  on  boards  of  directors  for  some  time
Braun  and  Sharma,  2007).
The  classical  agency  theory-based  arguments  state  that
aving  the  chief  executive  holding  the  highest  position  of
ower  on  the  board  reduces  the  ability  to  supervise.  Without
ppropriate  monitoring,  chief  executives  may  abuse  their
ower,  put  their  own  interests  ﬁrst  and  make  decisions  that
re  detrimental  to  the  ﬁrm,  such  as  hiring  incompetent  staff
r  making  overly  risky  or  conservative  decisions  and  lead  to
trategic  standstill  (Combs  et  al.,  2007;  García-Ramos  and
arcía-Olalla,  2011b;  Kor,  2006;  Miller  and  Le  Breton-Miller,
006).
However,  in  the  case  of  private  family  ﬁrms,  characteris-
ics  concerning  the  prevalence  of  stewardship  attitudes  and
sychosocial  altruism  lead  to  the  assumption  that  there  will
e  fewer  problems  of  power  abuse  and  self-control.  What
s  more,  arguments  in  favor  of  CEO  duality  can  be  found.
hus,  if  the  chief  executive  behaves  as  a  steward,  CEO  sat-
sfaction  is  tied  to  that  of  the  other  stakeholders  in  the  ﬁrm,
hich  means  there  is  no  risk  of  opportunistic  behavior  and
he  concentration  of  power  and  decision-making  capacity  in
his  person  will  be  positive  for  the  ﬁrm  (Chen  and  Hsu,  2009).
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n  this  way,  duality  will  be  an  advantage  insofar  as  it  would
rovide  the  ﬁrm  with  a  clear  focus  and  unity  of  command  at
he  highest  management  levels,  as  well  as  greater  autonomy
nd  response  capacity  in  top  decision  makers  and  improved
ow  of  communication  between  the  board  of  directors  and
he  management  team  (Braun  and  Sharma,  2007;  Palmon
nd  Wald,  2002).
Similarly,  high  committed  CEOs  holding  their  positions
uring  long  periods  of  time  may  be  more  able  to  develop
 series  of  speciﬁc  advantages  related  to  greater  opportu-
ities  for  learning  and  acquiring  speciﬁc  knowledge  about
heir  ﬁrms  (Kowalewski  et  al.,  2010;  Miller  and  Le  Breton-
iller,  2006;  Sacristán-Navarro  and  Gómez-Ansón,  2009).
herefore:
2.  In  non-listed  family  ﬁrms,  having  the  same  person
erving  as  chair  and  chief  executive  (duality)  will  positively
ffect  performance.
iversity  of  family  directors
ver  time,  family  ﬁrm  structures  are  likely  to  evolve  from
ontrolling  owner  into  sibling  partnerships  where  varying
roportions  of  ownerships  are  held  by  members  of  a  single
eneration.  They  can  also  evolve  into  cousin  consortiums
here  ownership  is  more  fractionalized  between  members
f  third  and  later  generations  (Gersick  et  al.,  1997).  As  a
onsequence  vote  control  is  going  to  be  spread  across  dif-
erent  family  members  who  normally  occupy  different  roles
e.g.  managers  vs  directors)  and  have  different  incentives
nd  interest  (Bammens  et  al.,  2008;  Gersick  et  al.,  1997;  Le
reton-Miller  et  al.,  2011;  Lubatkin  et  al.,  2005;  Thomas,
009).  This  evolution  in  ownership  is  parallel  to  the  devel-
pment  and  growth  of  both  the  ﬁrm  and  the  family,  which
n  turn  usually  involves  a  weakening  of  family  ties  (Gersick
t  al.,  1997;  Neubauer  and  Lank,  1998).
We  have  already  argued  that  the  strength  of  family  social
apital  is  determined  by  the  stability  of  the  relationship
etween  family  members,  the  interaction  and  interdepen-
ence  between  them  and  the  interconnections  within  the
amily.  Thus,  aspects  such  as  trust,  a  sense  of  mutual  obli-
ation,  norms  of  cooperation,  and  identiﬁcation  with  the
amily  group  and  the  ﬁrm,  which  constitute  the  relational
imension  of  social  capital,  could  weaken  as  family  ties
essen  (Salvato  and  Melin,  2008).  Reduced  family  cohe-
ion  can  make  the  ﬁrm  more  susceptible  to  experiencing
estructive  conﬂicts  capable  of  dividing  the  family  into
actions  based  on  generations  or  branches  of  the  family,
hich  detracts  from  performance  (Björnberg  and  Nicholson,
007;  Kellermanns  and  Eddleston,  2007).  Family  rivalry  and
ealousy,  in  addition  to  decreased  involvement  of  fam-
ly  members  in  company  management,  can  be  detrimental
o  communication  and  knowledge  exchange  (Zahra  et  al.,
007).
The  weakening  of  family  ties  could  have  as  a  conse-
uence  that  private  family  ﬁrms  could  lose  their  advantages
n  terms  of  social  capital  and  could  resemble  listed  family
rms  and  even  non-family  ﬁrms.  Consequently,  from  a
tewardship  theory  perspective,  the  conditions  for  the
lignment  of  objectives  between  family  owners  and  family
anagers,  that  is,  intrinsic  motivations  related  to  the
 ﬁrm
e
w
f
o
i
i
s
e
b
t
h
n
p
o
k
2
O
a
t
i
i
i
b
w
t
b
b
o
u
g
(
i
t
l
t
(
ﬂ
a
e
m
a
H
o
c
d
a
m
i
t
a
e
d
mThe  inﬂuence  of  type  of  directors  and  CEO  duality  in  family
welfare  of  the  business,  the  importance  of  non-ﬁnancial
goals,  emotion  and  sentiment-laden  long  term  relational
contracts  (Chrisman  et  al.,  2007),  can  be  eroded.  From  an
agency  theory  perspective  this  could  lead  to  an  increase  in
intrafamily  divergence  of  interests  produced  by  a  change  in
the  nature  of  the  predominant  altruism  in  family  relations
(Lubatkin  et  al.,  2005).  Psychosocial  altruism  could  be
replaced  by  asymmetric  altruism  with  each  family  branch
having  its  own  set  of  economic  and  non-economic  prefer-
ences  and  placing  their  own  nuclear  household’s  welfare
ahead  of  the  welfare  of  the  extended  family.  This  would
consequently  lead  to  an  increase  in  agency  problems  and
costs  (Bammens  et  al.,  2008,  2011;  García-Ramos  and
García-Olalla,  2011b;  Lubatkin  et  al.,  2005).  Therefore,
H3.  In  non-listed  family  ﬁrms,  a  higher  diversity  of  family
directors  will  negatively  affect  performance.
The  role  of  the  outsiders
In  general  literature  on  boards  of  directors,  board  effec-
tiveness  is  argued  to  rely  on  its  independence  and  this  may
be  enhanced  by  including  outsiders  in  it  (Chen  and  Hsu,
2009).  In  general  terms,  outside  directors  are  identiﬁed  as
board  members  who  do  not  belong  to  the  management  team
(Dalton  et  al.,  1998).  In  the  speciﬁc  case  of  family  ﬁrms,
outside  directors  are  regarded  as  those  that  do  not  belong
to  either  the  management  team  or  the  controlling  family
(Bettinelli,  2011;  Brunninge  et  al.,  2007;  Fiegener  et  al.,
2000;  Jaskiewicz  and  Klein,  2007).
On  the  basis  of  the  assumptions  of  agency  theory,  boards
primarily  consisting  of  outside  directors  have  a  greater
incentive  to  fulﬁll  the  role  of  supervising  and  controlling
the  executive  directors  (including  the  CEO)  so  that  their
actions  are  aimed  at  satisfying  owner  interests  and  pre-
venting  opportunistic  behavior.  On  this  basis,  most  recent
governance  reforms  are  based  on  the  premise  that  board
of  directors  of  publicly  held  corporations  should  work  truly
independently  from  management  teams.  In  order  to  do  so,
boards  of  directors  are  recommended  to  be  formed  by  a
majority  of  outsiders  (Fiegener  et  al.,  2000;  García-Ramos
and  García-Olalla,  2011b;  Lane  et  al.,  2006).
However,  even  for  the  context  of  public  family  ﬁrms  the
evidence  on  this  issue  is  mixed.  Anderson  and  Reeb  (2004),
for  instance,  in  their  study  of  public  ﬁrms  with  founding  fam-
ily  ownership,  show  that  outside  directors  have  a  positive
inﬂuence  on  performance  by  mitigating  conﬂicts  between
shareholders  groups  and  protecting  the  interests  of  minor-
ity  investors  through  their  supervisory  role.  On  their  part,
García-Ramos  and  García-Olalla  (2011b)  found  that  inde-
pendent  boards  improved  ﬁrm  performance  for  European
family  ﬁrms  led  by  their  founders  and  the  opposite  hap-
pens  in  ﬁrms  led  by  descendants.  San  Martin-Reyna  and
Duran-Encalada  (2012)  and  Klein  et  al.  (2005)  found  a  nega-
tive  relationship  between  independence  and  performance  of
Mexican  and  Canadian  public  family  ﬁrms  respectively.  The
scarce  evidence  for  the  case  of  private  family  ﬁrms  is  also
inconclusive.  Thus,  Schulze  et  al.  (2001)  found  a  negative
relationship,  Arosa  et  al.  (2010)  found  a  positive  relationship
but  only  for  the  case  of  ﬁrms  in  ﬁrst  generation,  and  Maseda
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t  al.  (2014)  found  and  inverted  U-shaped  relationship  also
ith  differences  between  generations.
The  literature  seems  to  support  the  idea  that  for  private
amily  ﬁrms  the  contribution  of  outside  directors  in  terms
f  the  supervisory  role  may  not  be  relevant,  as  the  same
ndividuals  tend  to  be  both  owners  and  managers.  Moreover,
n  the  special  context  of  these  ﬁrms  the  inﬂuence  of  out-
ide  directors  could  even  have  negative  consequences  (Lane
t  al.,  2006).  Thus,  insiders  who  are  key  stakeholders  can
e  expected  to  care  more  than  outsiders  about  the  health  of
heir  ﬁrms  (Le  Breton-Miller  et  al.,  2011).  Also,  outsiders  will
ave  less  knowledge  of  the  ﬁrm  and  its  context,  as  they  are
ot  involved  in  the  management  teams  and  neither  are  they
art  of  the  owning  families.  A  board  with  a  predominance  of
utside  directors  can  therefore  suffer  from  a  lack  of  speciﬁc
nowledge  and  information  about  the  ﬁrm  (Bammens  et  al.,
008;  Chen  and  Nowland,  2010;  García-Ramos  and  García-
lalla,  2011a,b;  Maseda  et  al.,  2014).  Furthermore,  from
 stewardship  perspective,  when  outsiders  are  included  in
he  boards  with  the  intention  of  controlling  managers,  the
ntrinsic  motivation  of  the  managers  may  decrease,  lead-
ng  them  to  reduce  their  pro-organizational  behavior  and
ncrease  opportunism  in  those  domains  where  they  cannot
e  adequately  controlled  (Bammens  et  al.,  2011).
Also,  in  relation  to  the  concept  of  social  capital,  a  board
ith  a  majority  of  outside  directors  is  less  likely  to  present
he  levels  of  trust  and  collaboration  between  board  mem-
ers,  and  subsequently  with  the  management  team,  that
oards  dominated  by  family  members  may  have.  The  ﬂow
f  communication  can  also  decline  in  comparison  with  a  sit-
ation  in  which  most  or  all  of  the  directors  belong  to  the
roup  of  insiders  (the  management  team  and/or  the  family)
Calabrò  and  Mussolino,  2011).  Directors  with  low  levels  of
nternal  social  capital  will  be  less  known  to  the  other  direc-
ors,  as  well  as  less  liked  and  trusted  by  them,  which  will
ead  to  a  decrease  in  levels  of  collaboration  and  communica-
ion  exchange  and  the  ability  of  the  board  to  work  as  a  team
Kim  and  Cannella,  2008).  All  of  these  can  cause  a  decline  in
exibility  and  adaptability  in  the  decision-making  process,
s  reaching  consensus  becomes  more  difﬁcult  (Brunninge
t  al.,  2007;  Ensley  and  Pearson,  2005).  This  can  be  detri-
ental  to  board  effectiveness  in  terms  of  the  advisor  role
nd  ultimately  to  company  performance.
4.  In  non-listed  family  ﬁrms,  a  board  with  a  majority  of
utside  directors  will  negatively  affect  performance.
However,  there  can  be  situations  where  outside  boards
ould  be  more  beneﬁcial  to  the  ﬁrm.  As  stated  above,  CEO
uality  can  be  positive  in  terms  of  unity  of  command,  greater
utonomy,  better  communication  ﬂows  with  the  manage-
ent  team  and  bigger  learning  opportunities.  However,
n  private  family  ﬁrms,  dependence  on  the  chief  execu-
ive  as  sole  decision  maker  is  usually  very  high  (Calabrò
nd  Mussolino,  2011;  Feltham  et  al.,  2005;  Voordeckers
t  al.,  2007).  This  can  cause  problems  such  as  a  lack  of
elegation  and/or  limited  joint  responsibility  in  decision
aking  in  favor  of  individuals  with  greater  knowledge.  It
an  also  lead  to  difﬁculties  in  the  process  of  succession,
hich  can  be  detrimental  to  company  development,  and
roblems  in  adapting  to  changing  circumstances  in  a  com-
etitive  environment  (Cutting  and  Kouzmin,  2000;  Feltham
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t  al.,  2005;  Harris  and  Helfat,  1998).  In  this  context,  out-
ide  directors  can  contribute  important  resources  to  the
rm,  such  as  general  business  knowledge,  contacts  and  rep-
tation,  which  can  foster  the  advisory  role  of  the  board
nd  improve  the  strategy  development  and  implementation
rocess  (Bammens  et  al.,  2011;  Gabrielsson  and  Winlund,
000;  Fiegener  et  al.,  2000;  Maseda  et  al.,  2014).  Outside
irectors  can  play  a  very  important  role  in  the  develop-
ent  of  strategic  change  processes  in  private  family  ﬁrms  by
aking  additional,  distinctive  contributions  to  the  strategic
ecision-making  process  (Bammens  et  al.,  2008;  Brunninge
t  al.,  2007;  Calabrò  and  Mussolino,  2011;  Johannisson  and
use,  2000;  Voordeckers  et  al.,  2007).  The  following  hypoth-
sis  can  therefore  be  proposed:
5.  In  non-listed  family  ﬁrms,  CEO  duality  will  moderate
he  effect  of  an  outside  board  on  performance  in  a  way  that
 board  with  a  majority  of  outside  directors  will  have  a  pos-
tive  effect  on  performance  when  chief  executive  duality
xists.
On  the  other  hand,  the  distinction  between  executive
nd  non-executive  family  directors,  that  is,  the  diversity  of
amily  directors,  could  lead  to  an  increase  in  agency  con-
icts  and  a  decrease  in  social  capital  as  stated  earlier.  In
hese  circumstances,  outside  directors  can  play  a  potentially
eneﬁcial  role  in  terms  of  defending  the  interests  of  the  var-
ous  groups  involved  in  the  ﬁrm  rather  than  only  defending
hose  of  the  top  management  team,  or  in  terms  of  pre-
enting  or  solving  conﬂicts  between  interest  groups  (Arosa
t  al.,  2010;  Bammens  et  al.,  2008,  2011;  Voordeckers  et  al.,
007;  Thomas,  2009).  Outside  directors  can  help  to  reduce
nformation  asymmetry  among  branches  of  the  family  and
an  serve  as  a  mechanism  to  manage  divergent  point  of
iew  among  family  members  bringing  clear  and  objective
ounsel  (Calabrò  and  Mussolino,  2011;  García-Ramos  and
arcía-Olalla,  2011b).  Also,  the  presence  of  outside  board
embers  can  motivate  family  members  to  manage  internal
onﬂicts  in  a  more  constructive  manner  (Bettinelli,  2011).
n  this  regard,  Jaskiewicz  and  Klein  (2007)  conclude  that
n  family  ﬁrms  in  which  alignment  of  objectives  between
amily  owners  and  family  managers  is  low,  the  number  of
ndependent  directors  on  the  board  is  likely  to  be  higher.
he  following  hypothesis  can  therefore  be  proposed:
6.  In  non-listed  family  ﬁrms,  the  diversity  of  family
irectors  will  moderate  the  effect  of  an  outside  board  on
erformance  in  a  way  that  a  board  with  a  majority  of  out-
ide  directors  will  have  a  positive  effect  on  performance
hen  the  diversity  of  family  directors  is  higher.
ethodology
ata
he  population  of  this  study  was  Spanish  non-listed  family
rms.  In  Spain  family  ﬁrms  are  a  predominant  form  of  busi-
ess  with  a  strong  presence  of  the  leading  families  in  their
wnership,  boards  and  management  teams  (Cabrera-Suárez
nd  Santana-Martín,  2004).  Spain  can  be  characterized  as
 country  with  a  legal  system  based  in  the  principles  of
•M.K.  Cabrera-Suárez,  J.D.  Martín-Santana
he  civil  law  in  contrast  with  the  Anglo-Saxon  model  based
n  common  law.  As  a  consequence,  there  is  a  low  level
f  protection  of  external  investors’  interest  and  boards  of
irectors  become  very  relevant  as  a  mechanism  of  corporate
overnance  (La  Porta  et  al.,  1998).  Therefore,  the  Spanish
ontext  is  quite  suitable  for  this  research  given  its  particular
haracteristics.
In  Spain  there  is  no  ofﬁcial  database  of  non-listed  family
rms,  so  we  have  had  to  create  it  by  indirectly  identifying
hese  ﬁrms  from  a  general  database  provided  by  Informa
un  &  Bradstreet.  This  company  was  asked  to  list  all  the
rms  on  its  database  whose  board  of  directors  and/or  mana-
ement  team  included  a  minimum  of  two  individuals  with
ifferent  ﬁrst  names  who  had  the  same  two  surnames  in
ommon.  Because  all  individuals  in  Spain  receive  two  sur-
ames,  one  from  each  parent,  people  whose  two  surnames
re  identical  are  very  likely  to  be  siblings.  Thus,  the  ini-
ial  database  comprised  4217  potential  family  ﬁrms.  The
nformation  available  on  each  of  the  companies  identiﬁed
an  be  grouped  into  two  large  categories:  (a)  general  data
f  the  company:  name,  mailing  address,  NACE  code,  sec-
or  of  activity,  date  of  incorporation,  legal  form  and  ﬁgures
n  company  results,  sales  and  number  of  employees  for  the
ears  1989--2007;  and  (2)  ﬁrst  name  and  both  surnames  of
embers  of  the  board  of  directors  and  the  members  of  the
anagement  team.  A  further  database  was  created  which,
n  addition  to  the  preceding  variables,  included  a  series  of
ariables  on  the  composition  of  the  board  and/or  mana-
ement  team.  These  variables  were  created  based  on  the
bove  information,  analyzing  each  ﬁrm  one  by  one,  and
sing  secondary  sources  such  as  Internet  when  necessary  to
omplete  the  data.  These  variables  are:
 Existence  or  absence  of  a  board  of  directors;  board  size
or,  in  the  absence  of  a  board,  existence  of  a  sole  admin-
istrator  or  joint  administrators.
 Size  of  the  management  team  and  list  of  positions  of
responsibility.
 Number  of  siblings  on  the  board  of  directors  and/or  in
the  management  team,  based  on  the  presence  of  individ-
uals  with  different  ﬁrst  names  whose  two  surnames  were
identical.  These  identical  surnames  were  taken  as  a  refe-
rence  for  identifying  other  family  members  involved  in
the  companies.
 Number  of  family  members  on  the  board  of  directors
and/or  in  the  management  team,  based  on  the  occur-
rence  of  individuals  who  had  at  least  one  of  the  surnames
identiﬁed  in  common.
 Whether  or  not  the  chairperson  of  the  board  of  directors
was  a  member  of  the  family.
 Presence  and  number  of  CEOs  and  general  managers;
whether  or  not  they  were  members  of  the  family;  and
correspondence  of  either  of  these  positions  with  that  of
board  chair.
 Number  of  executive  directors,  that  is,  those  who  simulta-
neously  appeared  as  members  of  the  management  team,
and  whether  or  not  they  were  members  of  the  family. Number  of  outside  directors,  that  is,  non-family,  non-
executive  directors.  That  is,  those  that  had  neither  of  the
family  surnames  and  were  not  members  of  the  manage-
ment  team.
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Table  1  Proﬁle  of  the  ﬁrms  analyzed.
Characteristics  n  %
Age
10  years  or  less 48  8.8
11--20 years 109  20.0
21--30 years  196  36.0
31--40 years  99  18.2
41--50 years  51  9.4
More than  50  years  41  7.5
Current  legal  form
S.A.  (Corporation)  411  75.6
S.L. (Limited  liability  company) 133  24.4
Sector of  activitya
Final  demand  products  industry  105  19.3
Derived  demand  products  industry  148  27.2
Building  66  12.1
Trade 127  23.4
Services  98  18.0
Number  of  employees  in  2007
10--25 employees 2  0.4
26--50 employees 47  8.6
51--75 employees 136  25.0
76--100 employees 85  15.6
101--150 employees 120  22.1
151--200 employees 40  7.4
201--300 employees 58  10.7
More than  300  employees 56  10.3
2007 sales  ﬁgures
Less  than  5,000,000  euros  a  year  33  6.1
5,000,001--10,000,000  euros  a  year  95  17.5
10,000,001--30,000,000  euros  a  year  264  48.5
30,000,001--50,000,000  euros  a  year  66  12.1
50,000,001--70,000,000  euros  a  year  31  5.7
70,000,001--100,000,000  euros  a  year  18  3.3
100,000,001--200,000,000  euros  a  year  23  4.2
More than  200,000,000  euros  14  2.6
Management  team  size
3  or  4  members  431  79.2
5 or  6  members  99  18.2
7 or  8  members  14  2.6
Total 544  100.00
a The sector labeled as ﬁnal demand products industry includes
ﬁrms from the food industry; textile and footwear industry;
wood, paper and cardboard industry; furniture industry and
other industries related to jewellery, games, sport, music, etc.
The sector labeled as derived demand products industry includes
ﬁrms related to graphic arts, chemical industry, building mate-
rial manufacture, machine building, electronic and electricalThe  inﬂuence  of  type  of  directors  and  CEO  duality  in  family
On  completion  of  the  database,  ﬁrms  in  which  any  of  the
following  circumstances  occurred  were  deleted:  (1)  full  gen-
eral  data  were  not  available;  (2)  an  insolvency  administrator
had  been  appointed;  (3)  the  ﬁrm  was  a  subsidiary  company
of  another  ﬁrm  already  included  in  the  database;  (4)  the
ﬁrm  included  two  or  more  families  that  were  not  related  in
any  way;  and  (5)  the  ﬁrm  was  chaired  by  a  company.  After
this  selection,  the  number  of  ﬁrms  was  2179.
Lastly,  to  ensure  that  the  characteristics  of  the  com-
panies  would  enable  the  objectives  of  the  study  to  be
achieved,  ﬁrms  in  which  the  following  conditions  existed
were  selected:
•  The  chairperson  of  the  board  belonged  to  the  family.  This
ensured  that  the  companies  studied  were  those  in  which
family  members  held  the  highest  positions  of  responsibil-
ity  on  the  board.
•  The  board  of  directors  had  at  least  three  members.
•  The  management  team  included  at  least  three  positions
of  responsibility.
•  The  number  of  employees  was  at  least  10.  The  main
reason  for  only  selecting  ﬁrms  with  more  than  10  employ-
ees  was  to  exclude  micro-ﬁrms,  as  their  organization  and
management  needs  are  usually  met  by  the  management
team.  Thus,  in  ﬁrms  with  more  than  10  employees,  the
board  of  directors  is  more  likely  to  have  a  real  role;
their  tasks  are  more  complex,  the  organization  has  to
be  more  sophisticated  and  there  is  a  greater  division  of
duties  between  the  management  team  and  the  board  of
directors.
•  The  ﬁrm  did  not  belong  to  the  ﬁnancial  sector  and  was
not  listed  on  the  stock  market.
Consequently,  we  consider  a  ﬁrm  to  be  a  family  ﬁrm  if  it
has  at  least  two  people  with  different  ﬁrst  names  and  two
identical  surnames  (i.e.  they  are  siblings)  on  the  board  of
directors  and/or  management  teams,  and  the  chairperson  of
the  board  has  at  least  one  of  these  two  surnames  (i.e.  he/she
is  a  family  member).  That  is  how  we  tried  to  ensure  that  the
identiﬁed  ﬁrms  are  in  essence  family  ﬁrms.  On  the  one  hand,
these  two  criteria  ensure  there  is  a  real  family  inﬂuence  on
decision  making,  which  is  an  essential  form  of  family  involve-
ment  that  shapes  the  distinctiveness  of  a  family  ﬁrm  (Chua
et  al.,  1999;  Fiegener,  2010).  On  the  other  hand,  the  pres-
ence  of  siblings  in  the  governing  bodies  implies  an  intention,
or  in  fact,  the  transmission  of  leadership  between  genera-
tions  in  the  family;  this,  in  turn,  is  another  key  factor  in
the  deﬁnition  of  family  ﬁrms  (Astrachan  et  al.,  2002;  Chua
et  al.,  1999;  Sirmon  and  Hitt,  2003;  Zellweger  et  al.,  2010).
Finally,  the  presence  of  family  members  on  the  board  and
the  fact  that  the  chair  of  the  board  is  a  family  member  also
allows  us  to  infer  that  the  ownership  of  the  ﬁrm  is  in  fact
controlled  by  the  family  (García-Castro  and  Casasola,  2011).
Previous  studies  on  property  and  control  structures  of  public
family  ﬁrms  in  Spain  show  that  in  more  than  two-thirds  of  the
ﬁrms  that  have  an  individual  or  a  family  as  ultimate  owner,
a  member  of  the  family  holds  the  post  of  CEO  or  chairman
of  the  board  (Sacristán-Navarro  and  Gómez-Ansón,  2007).  If
this  is  the  case  in  large  listed  ﬁrms,  we  can  expect  this  to
occur  in  non-listed  family  ﬁrms.
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pequipment industry, transport industry, and recycling, water and
energy industries.
Thus,  544  ﬁrms  were  ﬁnally  included  in  the  study.  The
eneral  characteristics  of  these  ﬁrms  are  shown  in  Table  1.
t  can  be  seen  that  28.8  percent  of  the  ﬁrms  were  up  to  20
ears  all,  36  percent  of  the  ﬁrms  were  21--30  years  old,  and
5.1  percent  were  more  than  30  years  old.  More  than  75
ercent  were  corporations.  Almost  50  percent  carried  out
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Table  2  Board  structure  in  the  ﬁrms  analyzed.
Characteristics  N  %
Board  size
3 or  4  members  283  52.0
5 or  6  members  165  30.3
7 or  8  members  55  10.1
9 or  10  members  26  4.8
More than  10  members  15  2.8
Percentage  of  executive  directors
0--25  percent  217  39.9
26--50 percent 205  37.7
51--75 percent 94  17.3
76--100 percent 28  5.1
Percentage  of  family  directors
0--25  percent  15  2.8
26--50 percent  111  20.4
51--75 percent  115  21.1
76--100 percent  303  55.7
Percentage  of  outside  directors
0--25  percent 382  70.2
26--50 percent 110  20.2
51--75 percent 46  8.5
76--100 percent  6  1.1
Percentage  of  non-executive  family  directorsa
0--25  percent  70  12.9
26--50 percent  166  30.5
51--75 percent  178  32.7
76--100 percent  130  23.9
Total 544  100.00
a Percentage calculated from total family directors.
a
b
6
m
m
o
(
m
i
o
7
t
p
5
o
5
f
p
t
c
n
D
D
P
o
a
h
(
t
e
o
e
t
t
i
t
I
I
p
e
•
•
•
•ctivities  in  the  industrial  sector,  with  the  other  50  percent
eing  involved  in  the  sectors  of  building,  trade  and  services.
2.7  percent  had  50--150  employees  and  28.4  percent  had
ore  than  150.  48.5  percent  had  a  sales  ﬁgure  of  10--30
illion  euros  in  2007  and  27.9  percent  had  a  sales  ﬁgure
f  more  than  30  million  in  the  same  year.  Most  of  the  ﬁrms
79.2  percent)  had  a  management  team  with  three  or  four
embers.
Table  2 shows  the  structure  of  the  boards  of  directors
n  the  ﬁrms  studied.  The  data  show  that  the  size  of  most
f  the  boards  was  three  to  six  members  (88.3  percent).  In
7.6  percent  of  the  ﬁrms  the  percentage  of  executive  direc-
ors  was  lower  than  50  percent.  Most  of  the  boards  (76.8
ercent)  had  a  percentage  of  family  directors  higher  than
0  percent.  In  90.4  percent  of  the  ﬁrms,  the  percentage  of
utside  directors  on  the  board  was  less  than  50  percent.  In
6.6  percent  of  the  ﬁrms,  the  proportion  of  non-executive
amily  directors  to  total  family  directors  was  more  than  50
ercent.  The  general  conclusions  that  can  be  drawn  from
hese  results  are  that  the  boards  of  the  ﬁrms  analyzed  were
ontrolled  by  families  and  most  included  a  high  presence  of
on-executive  family  members.
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eﬁnition  of  variables
ependent  variable
roductivity  measured  as  the  natural  logarithm  of  the  ratio
f  sales  to  employees  in  2007  was  used  as  the  outcome  vari-
ble  and,  therefore,  as  the  dependent  variable.  Productivity
as  been  a  well  used  variable  as  a  measure  of  performance
e.g.  Misterek  et  al.,  1992;  Sinclair  and  Zairi,  2000).  Also
he  use  of  sales  ﬁgures  to  calculate  productivity  is  consid-
red  more  trustworthy  and  less  subject  to  manipulation  than
ther  ﬁgures  related  to  proﬁts  (Oswald  et  al.,  2009;  Schulze
t  al.,  2001).  The  logarithmic  transformation  was  applied
o  make  the  variable  behave  according  to  a  normal  dis-
ribution  (Kolmogorov--Smirnov  Z  =  4.698,  p  =  0.000  for  the
nitial  variable;  Kolmogorov--Smirnov  Z  =  1.267,  p  =  0.081  for
he  transformed  variable).
ndependent  variables
n  line  with  the  hypotheses  of  this  study,  the  following  inde-
endent  variables  were  established  using  the  information
ntered  into  the  database:
 CEO  duality  (DUAL).  This  is  a  dichotomous  variable  that
takes  the  value  ‘‘1’’  when  the  CEO  or  general  manager
also  holds  the  position  of  board  chair,  and  ‘‘0’’  other-
wise.  In  the  sample  studied,  63.2  percent  of  ﬁrms  showed
duality.
 The  proportion  of  executive  directors  (PEXECDIR)  as  the
ratio  of  executive  directors  to  total  number  of  directors.
 The  majority  of  outside  directors  on  the  board  (MAJOUT-
DIR).  This  dichotomous  variable  takes  the  value  ‘‘1’’  when
the  proportion  of  outside  directors  on  the  board  is  more
than  50  percent  and  ‘‘0’’  when  it  is  50  percent  or  less.
It  has  been  considered  that  in  a  board  with  a  majority
of  outside  directors,  these  will  have  a considerable  inﬂu-
ence  on  the  board,  rather  than  a merely  residual  inﬂuence
with  no  real  power  to  make  decisions.  In  fact,  according
to  Schulze  et  al.  (2001), experts  in  family  ﬁrms  recom-
mend  having  a  percentage  of  outside  directors  of  30--40
percent.  In  the  present  study  this  ﬁgure  was  raised  to  50
percent,  as  the  methods  used  to  identify  family  mem-
bers  did  not  enable  in-laws  to  be  identiﬁed  and  therefore,
some  of  the  directors  thought  to  be  outside  the  control-
ling  family  may  in  fact  not  have  fallen  into  this  category.
In  the  sample  studied,  90.4  percent  had  a  board  on  which
outside  directors  were  a  minority.
 The  diversity  of  family  directors  (DIVFAMDIR).  This  vari-
able  is  measured  as  the  absolute  value  of  the  difference
in  the  percentages  of  executive  and  non-executive  family
directors.  The  mathematical  expression  is  as  follows:
N.  executive  family  directors
Board  size
× 100
− N.  non-executive  family  directors
Board  size
×  100Thus,  the  higher  the  value  of  the  variable  the  lower  is  the
iversity  between  family  directors.  That  is,  when  there  is  a
ominance  of  one  type  of  family  directors  (less  diversity)  the
alue  of  the  variable  tends  to  100.  Conversely,  in  the  case  of
 ﬁrm
o
e
c
j
v
v
m
b
p
o
s
T
v
o
W
R
p
R
B
c
a
m
t
l
u
t
c
b
l
t
b
a
t
a
b
i
S
(
a
b
p
i
d
t
C
b
a
m
s
I
d
(
aThe  inﬂuence  of  type  of  directors  and  CEO  duality  in  family
maximum  diversity  (each  type  of  family  director  holds  the
same  percentage  of  seats  at  the  board),  the  value  of  the
variable  is  zero.
Moderator  effects
A  moderator  or  an  interaction  effect  occurs  when  the  mod-
erator  variable,  a  second  independent  variable,  changes
the  relationship  between  another  independent  variable  and
the  dependent  variable,  namely,  an  effect  in  which  a  third
independent  variable  (the  moderator  variable)  causes  the
relationship  between  a  dependent/independent  variable
pair  to  change,  depending  on  the  value  of  the  moderator
variable.  The  moderator  effect  is  represented  in  multiple
regression  by  a  compound  variable  formed  by  multiplying
the  independent  variable  by  the  moderator  variable,  which
is  entered  into  the  regression  equation.  The  two  modera-
tor  effects  proposed  in  hypotheses  H5  and  H6  are  linked  to
two  interaction  variables  whose  purpose  is  to  determine  the
extent  to  which  the  effect  of  a  majority  of  outside  direc-
tors  on  performance  is  positive  in  case  of  duality  and/or
a  higher  diversity  of  family  directors.  The  two  moderating
variables  therefore  correspond  to  the  following  interactions
of  independent  variables:
•  Interaction  between  the  DUAL  variable  and  the  MAJOUT-
DIR  variable,  labeled  ‘‘DUAL*MAJOUTDIR’’.
•  Interaction  between  the  DIVFAMDIR  variable  and  the
MAJOUTDIR  variable,  labeled  ‘‘DIVFAMDIR*MAJOUTDIR’’.
Control  variables
The  following  control  variables  were  included  in  the  multiple
linear  regression  model:
• Sector  of  activity.  Four  dummy  variables  were  estab-
lished,  with  the  reference  value  being  the  service  sector.
Thus  the  DUMSEC1  variable  took  the  value  ‘‘1’’  if  the
activities  of  the  ﬁrm  belonged  to  the  industrial  sector
of  ﬁnal  demand  products,  and  ‘‘0’’  otherwise;  the  DUM-
SEC2  variable  took  the  value  ‘‘1’’  if  the  ﬁrm  carried  out
its  activity  in  the  industrial  sector  of  derived  demand
products,  and  ‘‘0’’  otherwise  and  so  on.  As  a  result,
the  regression  coefﬁcients  of  the  four  dummy  variables
represent  the  differential  effect  of  each  sector  on  the
dependent  variable  in  relation  to  the  reference  category
(service  sector).
•  Age  of  the  ﬁrm  (LNAGE).  Measured  as  the  number  of
years  since  the  ﬁrm’s  foundation.  In  this  case,  as  with  the
dependent  variable,  the  natural  logarithm  was  applied  to
minimize  asymmetry,  given  the  high  variability  this  vari-
able  presented.
• Size  of  the  ﬁrm  (LSIZE).  Measured  as  the  number  of  the
employees  in  2007.  The  natural  logarithm  was  applied
to  minimize  asymmetry,  given  the  high  variability  of  this
variable.
AnalysesWe  made  use  of  a  hierarchical  multiple  regression,  which
is  a  variant  of  the  basic  multiple  regression  procedure  that
allows  specifying  a  ﬁxed  order  of  entry  for  variables  in  order
to  control  for  the  effects  of  covariates  or  to  test  the  effects
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f  certain  predictors  independent  of  the  inﬂuence  of  oth-
rs.  Thus,  we  were  able  to  analyze:  ﬁrst,  the  effect  of  the
ontrol  variables  on  the  dependent  variable;  second,  the
oint  effect  of  all  independent  variables  on  the  dependent
ariable,  regardless  of  the  signiﬁcance  levels  of  the  control
ariables;  and,  third,  the  additional  effect  of  each  of  the
oderating  variables  in  the  explanatory  power  of  the  model,
ecause  the  change  in  R2 allows  us  to  evaluate  how  much
redictive  power  was  added  to  the  model  by  the  addition
f  the  moderator  effect.  If  the  change  in  R2 is  statistically
igniﬁcant,  then  a  signiﬁcant  moderator  effect  is  present.
hus,  only  the  incremental  effect  is  assessed,  not  the  indi-
idual  variables.  Finally,  for  the  overall  level  of  signiﬁcance
f  the  model  the  F  ratio  and  the  corrected  R2 were  used.
e  use  the  corrected  R2 because  in  practice  the  use  of
2 has  some  limitations  when  comparing  models  from  the
erspective  of  the  goodness  of  ﬁt.
esults
efore  testing  the  hypotheses,  the  existence  of  multi-
ollinearity  between  the  variables  in  the  model  was  tested,
s  this  is  one  of  the  problems  encountered  in  regression
odels,  particularly  in  moderated  regression  analyses.  To
his  end,  three  processes  were  used:  analysis  of  correlation
evels  between  the  continuous  variables,  analysis  of  the  val-
es  of  the  variance  inﬂation  factor  (VIF),  and  analysis  of
olerance  levels.
Table  3  shows  the  correlation  coefﬁcients  between  the
ontinuous  variables  used  in  the  regression  models.  It  can
e  seen  that  discriminant  validity  exists  insofar  as  all  corre-
ation  coefﬁcients  are  low  and  therefore  it  can  be  assumed
hat  there  is  no  multicollinearity.  The  same  conclusion  can
e  drawn  on  observing  the  VIF  values  and  tolerance  levels,
s  the  VIF  values  are  far  from  the  threshold  of  10  and  the
olerance  levels  are  higher  than  0.10.
The  hypotheses  were  tested  using  hierarchical  regression
nalysis,  in  which  the  variables  are  entered  in  successive
locks  (Table  4).  Thus  Model  I,  which  is  the  baseline  model,
ncludes  only  the  control  variables:  sector  of  activity  (DUM-
EC1,  DUMSEC2,  DUMSEC3  and  DUMSEC4),  age  of  the  ﬁrm
LNAGE)  and  size  of  the  ﬁrm  (LSIZE).  Model  II  includes,  in
ddition  to  the  control  variables,  all  the  independent  varia-
les  introduced  in  block,  that  is,  the  CEO  duality  (DUAL),  the
roportion  of  executive  directors  (PEXECDIR),  the  major-
ty  of  outside  directors  on  the  board  (MAJOUTDIR)  and  the
iversity  of  family  directors  (DIVFAMDIR).  Model  III  addi-
ionally  includes  an  interaction  term  between  the  variables
EO  duality  (DUAL)  and  majority  of  outside  directors  on  the
oard  (MAJOUTDIR)  --  called  ‘‘DUAL*MAJOUTDIR’’  --  which
llow  recording  the  combined  of  the  CEO  duality  and  the
ajority  of  outside  directors  on  the  board  on  the  ratio  of
ales  to  employees.  Finally,  Model  IV  added  to  the  Model
I  the  interaction  term  between  the  diversity  of  family
irectors  (DIVFAMDIR)  and  the  majority  of  outside  directors
MAJOUTDIR)  --  called  ‘‘DIVFAMDIR*MAJOUTDIR’’  --  which
llow  recording  the  combined  of  both  variables  on  the  ratio
f  sales  to  employees.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  moder-
ting  effect  is  signiﬁcant  if  the  change  in  the  determination
oefﬁcient  is  signiﬁcant.  In  this  regard,  empirical  evidence
ndicates  that  an  increase  of  more  than  1  percent  can  be
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onsidered  signiﬁcant  and  therefore  indicates  the  existence
f  a  large  moderating  effect.
The  results  of  the  ﬁrst  regression  model,  shown  in  the
econd  column  of  Table  4  (Model  I),  indicate  that  the  sector
f  activity  in  which  the  ﬁrm  is  involved  is  a variable  that
nﬂuences  company  performance.  Concretely,  it  is  shown
hat  the  ratio  of  sales  to  employees  is  higher  for  the  ﬁrms  in
o  service  industries  as  could  be  expected.  However,  the  age
f  the  ﬁrm  and  its  size  do  not  have  inﬂuence  on  productivity.
The  next  step  was  to  estimate  the  regression  model  by
dding  the  results  of  the  four  explanatory  variables  consid-
red  in  this  study  (shown  in  column  three  of  Table  4  --  Model
I).  It  can  be  seen  that  a  signiﬁcant  change  occurred  in  the
etermination  coefﬁcient  (R2 =  2.9  percent;  F  =  3.878;
 = 0.004)  in  this  model,  indicating  the  signiﬁcant  effect  of
he  explanatory  variables  considered  on  the  dependent  vari-
ble  and  therefore  the  effect  of  board  of  director  structure
n  company  performance.  More  speciﬁcally,  the  results  of
his  regression  analysis  enabled  the  following  conclusions:
 A  negative  relation  exists  between  the  proportion  of  exec-
utive  directors  on  the  board  and  non-listed  family  ﬁrm
performance  (t  =  −2.865,  p  =  0.004),  which  means  that
hypothesis  H1  is  accepted,  since  it  was  expected  that
a  higher  proportion  of  executive  directors  would  have  a
negative  effect  on  the  performance  of  the  ﬁrms.
 The  positive  and  signiﬁcant  coefﬁcient  for  the  DUAL  vari-
able  indicates  that  having  the  same  person  holding  the
positions  of  board  chair  and  chief  executive  is  posi-
tively  related  to  performance  (t  =  2.942,  p  =  0.003),  which
means  that  hypothesis  H2  is  accepted.
 A  higher  diversity  of  family  directors  does  not  have  a
signiﬁcant  effect  on  non-listed  family  ﬁrm  performance
(t  =  −1.162,  p  =  0.246).  Also  the  negative  sign  of  the  coef-
ﬁcient  is  not  the  expected  one  because  it  means  that  the
higher  the  value  of  this  variable  (less  diversity)  the  worse
the  effects  on  performance.  Therefore  hypothesis  H3  is
rejected.
 A  majority  presence  of  outside  directors  on  family  ﬁrm
boards  has  a  signiﬁcant  negative  effect  on  family  ﬁrm
performance  (t  =  −1.857,  p  =  0.064),  which  means  that
hypothesis  H4  is  accepted.
An  estimation  was  made  of  Models  III  and  IV,  which  incor-
orate  to  Model  II  the  two  moderating  effects  considered
ndependently.  Results  of  these  models  are  also  shown  in
able  4. As  seen  in  the  results  obtained,  the  incorpora-
ion  of  the  ﬁrst  moderating  variable  (DUAL*MAJOUTDIR)
nto  Model  II  signiﬁcantly  increased  the  determination  coef-
cient  (R2 =  1.3  percent;  F  =  7.106;  p  =  0.008).  Because
f  this,  the  effect  of  this  variable  is  signiﬁcant  (t  =  2.666,
 = 0.008).  This  implies  that  a  majority  of  outside  directors
n  non-listed  family  ﬁrm  boards  has  a  positive  effect  on
erformance  when  CEO  duality  exists,  so  hypothesis  H5  is
ccepted.  Thus,  if  there  is  CEO  duality,  the  positive  effect  of
his  variable  on  performance  is  stronger  because  CEO  duality
as  a  positive  moderator  effect  on  the  relationship  between
he  majority  of  outside  directors  and  performance.  The  stan-
ardized  beta  coefﬁcient  (0.170)  shows  the  unitary  change
n  the  effect  of  CEO  duality  on  performance  when  the  pro-
ortion  of  outside  directors  changes.  Thus,  if  this  proportion
s  more  than  50  percent,  the  total  effect  of  CEO  duality  on
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Table  4  Results  of  multiple  linear  hierarchical  regression  models.
Independent  variables Model  I Model  II Model  III Model  IV
Standardized  beta
coefﬁcients
t  Standardized  beta
coefﬁcients
t  Standardized  beta
coefﬁcients
t  Standardized  beta
coefﬁcients
t
Constant  38.258*** 35.451*** 35.781*** 35.146***
DUMSEC1  0.325 5.784*** 0.317 5.649*** 0.292 5.153*** 0.314 5.576***
DUMSEC2  0.377 6.452*** 0.363 6.237*** 0.347 5.971*** 0.364 6.264***
DUMSEC3  0.329 6.290*** 0.319 6.056*** 0.310 5.901*** 0.320 6.079***
DUMSEC4  0.307 6.112*** 0.304 6.045*** 0.293 5.838*** 0.302 6.009***
LNAGE  0.061  1.360  0.041  0.914  0.057  1.276  0.046  1.032
LNSIZE −0.052  −1.162  −0.064  −1.416  −0.076  −1.690* −0.062  −1.366
DUAL 0.142  2.942*** 0.101  2.003** 0.139  2.866***
PEXECDIR  −0.146  −2.865*** −0.138  −2.721*** −0.143  −2.803***
MAJOUTDIR  −0.088  −1.857* −0.204  −3.183*** −0.023  −0.324
DIVFAMDIR −0.054  −1.162  −0.055  −1.190  −0.045  −0.954
DUAL*MAJOUTDIR  0.170  2.666***
DIVFAMDIR*MAJOUTDIR  −0.085  −1.293
Corrected R2 0.129  0.150  0.162  0.172
F 12.312*** 9.126*** 9.055*** 8.460***
R2 0.029  0.013  0.003
F 3.878*** 7.106*** 1.672
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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erformance  is  0.271  (0.101  +  0.170);  but  when  it  is  lower  or
qual  to  50  percent  the  effect  is  0.101.
In  relation  to  the  second  moderating  variable  (DIV-
AMDIR*MAJOUTDIR),  its  effect  is  not  signiﬁcant  (t  =  −1.293,
 =  0.197).  In  fact,  the  incorporation  of  this  second  moderat-
ng  variable  into  Model  II  does  not  signiﬁcantly  increase  the
etermination  coefﬁcient  (R2 =  0.3  percent;  F  =  1.672;
 =  0.197).  Therefore,  H6  must  be  rejected.
Lastly,  the  Kolmogorov--Smirnov  Z-test  was  applied  to
he  non-standardized  residuals  of  Models  III  and  IV  to  test
he  normality  of  the  residuals  and  guarantee  the  reliability
nd  validity  of  the  results.  The  results  obtained  showed  the
ormality  of  the  residuals  (Kolmogorov--Smirnov  Z  =  1.324,
 =  0.060  for  Model  III  and  Kolmogorov--Smirnov  Z  =  1.378,
 =  0.045  for  Model  IV).
To  validate  the  model,  a  robustness  check  was  carried  out
sing  an  industry-adjusted  regression  analysis,  where  the
atural  logarithm  of  ﬁrm  productivity  relativized  in  terms
f  the  productivity  of  the  ﬁrm’s  economic  sector  was  used
s  the  dependent  variable  (Appendix  2).  The  results  can  be
onsidered  robust  as  there  were  no  signiﬁcant  differences
hen  it  came  to  verifying  the  hypotheses.  There  is  also  no
igniﬁcant  difference  in  the  standardized  coefﬁcients.
iscussion and  conclusions
his  study  contributes  empirical  evidence  to  the  little-
tudied  area  of  governance  in  family  ﬁrms,  with  particular
mphasis  on  non-listed  family  ﬁrms.  The  special  features
f  these  ﬁrms  in  terms  of  stronger  family  ties,  steward-like
ttitudes  and  of  psychosocial  altruism  give  special  relevance
o  the  advisor  role  of  the  board.  Therefore,  we  have  included
omplementary  theoretical  approaches  to  agency  theory,
uch  as  the  stewardship  theory,  to  explain  board  composition
nd  its  inﬂuence  on  performance,  due  to  the  speciﬁc  fea-
ures  of  decision  making  and  governance  dynamics  conferred
n  these  ﬁrms  by  their  family  aspect.  Therefore,  we  believe
hat  this  paper  contributes  signiﬁcantly  to  the  literature  on
amily  ﬁrms.  Published  research  on  family  ﬁrm  governance
ses  samples  mainly  from  listed  ﬁrms,  and  their  theoretical
ine  of  argument  is  often  based  on  the  traditional  literature
n  family  ﬁrms,  which  really  refers  to  the  nature  and  behav-
or  of  private  family  ﬁrms  (Combs,  2008).  This  paper  starts
rom  this  premise  and  argues  hypotheses  on  board  composi-
ion  and  performance  which  are  somewhat  different  to  the
nes  proposed  in  the  general  literature  on  governance  and
hich  take  into  account  the  speciﬁc  nature  of  private  fam-
ly  ﬁrms.  The  overall  conclusion  that  can  be  drawn  from
he  results  obtained  is  that  the  structure  of  the  board  of
irectors  affects  the  performance  of  non-listed  family  ﬁrms,
nd  that  the  suitable  structure  is  somewhat  different  to  the
ne  suggested  in  the  general  literature  on  boards  or  in  the
iterature  on  boards  in  public  family  ﬁrms.
According  to  our  ﬁndings,  a  higher  proportion  of  exec-
tive  directors  negatively  affects  performance,  just  as  we
xpected.  Although  the  typical  agency  problems  associated
o  asymmetric  altruism  and  opportunistic  behavior  are  less
ommon  in  private  family  ﬁrms,  a  board  with  a  high  pres-
nce  of  executives  allows  little  room  for  alternative  points
f  view  from  those  of  the  management  team.  This  can  limit
he  strategic  options  considered  by  the  board,  as  well  as
n
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he  depth  and  quality  of  contributions  to  the  assessment
nd  discussion  of  strategic  alternatives,  negatively  affect-
ng  the  advisor  role  of  the  board.  This  problem  of  a  lack
f  quality  in  decision-making  processes  can  be  accentuated
f,  as  usually  happens,  decisions  on  promotion  toward  man-
gerial  positions  in  private  family  ﬁrms  are  based  more  on
inship  criteria  than  on  professional  criteria  related  to  capa-
ility  and  suitability  for  the  position  (de  Kok  et  al.,  2006).
hus,  an  interesting  line  for  future  research  could  explore
he  relationship  between  governance  and  the  management
f  human  resources  in  family  ﬁrms.
As  expected,  the  results  also  show  that  having  the  same
erson  holding  the  top  position  of  responsibility  both  on
he  board  and  in  the  management  team  has  a  positive
ffect  on  family  ﬁrm  performance.  These  results  differ  from
hose  obtained  by  Braun  and  Sharma  (2007)  for  family-
ontrolled  public  ﬁrms.  These  authors  state  that  duality
y  itself  does  not  inﬂuence  ﬁrm  performance  and  that  the
elationship  between  duality  and  performance  is  moderated
y  the  level  of  family  ownership.  They  conclude  that  non-
uality  is  more  effectual  in  relation  to  performance  when
he  family  has  a  lower  level  of  ownership,  because  in  that
ituation  noncontrolling  (i.e.  nonfamily)  stakeholders  are
ore  able  to  mitigate  expropriation  from  the  part  of  the
amily.  Therefore,  Braun  and  Sharma  (2007)  found  support
or  the  arguments  of  agency  theory  in  the  case  of  the  public
amily  ﬁrm.  On  their  part,  Lam  and  Lee  (2007), also  study-
ng  public  ﬁrms,  found  a  negative  relationship  between  CEO
uality  and  performance.  They  explained  this  result  based
n  agency  theoretical  arguments  related  to  managerial
ntrenchment  and  expropriation  of  minority  stakeholders.
owever,  García-Ramos  and  García-Olalla  (2011b)  found
hat  the  relationship  between  CEO  duality  and  ﬁrm  perfor-
ance  is  positive  for  family  ﬁrms  run  by  descendants  and
on-signiﬁcant  for  family  ﬁrms  led  by  founders.  The  authors
uggest  that  these  results  are  consistent  with  the  position
f  stewardship  theorists  who  argue  that  CEO  duality  can
ave  a  positive  inﬂuence  on  performance.  This  may  be  espe-
ially  true  for  the  context  of  private  family  ﬁrms,  where  high
evels  of  family  ownership  could  enhance  the  level  of  com-
itment  of  family  leaders  and  therefore  their  motivation
oward  stewardship  behavior  (Le  Breton-Miller  et  al.,  2011).
s  a  result,  duality  could  be  a  way  of  providing  ﬁrms  with
he  advantages  derived  from  the  unity  of  command  at  top
anagement  levels,  such  as  a  clearer  strategic  orientation,
reater  autonomy  and  greater  response  capacity.  Also,  in
rivate  family  ﬁrms,  family  leaders  tend  to  hold  their  posi-
ions  for  a  long  period  of  time,  which  can  be  advantageous  in
erms  of  learning  and  acquiring  speciﬁc  knowledge  of  their
rms  (Miller  and  Le  Breton-Miller,  2006).
No  evidence  was  found  to  support  the  hypothesis  pro-
osed  in  this  study  that  a  higher  diversity  of  family  directors
egatively  affects  company  performance.  The  distinction
etween  executive  and  non-executive  family  directors
ay  not  necessarily  imply  an  increase  in  the  divergence
f  interests  or,  therefore,  of  agency  conﬂicts  between
he  two  types  of  directors.  Similarly,  the  family  ties  and
he  associated  advantages  in  terms  of  social  capital  may
ot  necessarily  be  adversely  affected  by  a  differentiation
etween  family  directors.  That  depends,  among  other
hings,  on  the  capacity  of  the  families  to  govern  themselves
nd  to  keep  unity  between  family  members  using  speciﬁc
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family  governance  mechanisms  like  family  protocols  or
family  councils  (Lubatkin  et  al.,  2005;  Neubauer  and
Lank,  1998).  Therefore,  to  be  able  to  test  these  possible
explanations,  it  would  have  been  useful  to  have  data  on  the
distribution  of  ownership  among  family  members,  the  type
of  economic  and  non-economic  objectives  pursued  by  the
owners,  the  degree  of  congruity  between  the  objectives
of  individual  groups  of  relatives,  the  quality  of  family
relationships  and  the  existence  of  governance  mechanisms
within  the  family.  These  variables  were  not  available  due
to  the  sources  of  information  used,  although  these  issues
would  constitute  interesting  areas  for  future  research.
As  expected,  we  found  a  negative  relation  between  the
existence  of  outside  boards  and  performance.  This  result
seems  to  support  the  idea  that,  in  non-listed  family  ﬁrms,
the  beneﬁts  of  an  outside  board  in  terms  of  a  higher  supervi-
sory  capacity  and  a  wider  base  of  resources  could  be  offset
by  the  losses  in  terms  of  speciﬁc  knowledge  about  the  ﬁrm,
level  of  commitment,  emotional  ties,  trust,  and  other  ben-
eﬁts  related  to  social  capital  that  insiders  are  more  likely  to
posses.
However,  the  results  also  show  that  the  inﬂuence  of
outside  boards  becomes  positive  when  it  is  considered  in
interaction  with  CEO  duality.  That  is,  outside  directors  play  a
signiﬁcant  positive  role  in  situations  where  maximum  power
is  held  by  the  chief  executive.  Given  that  the  occurrence
of  CEO  duality  is  higher  in  ﬁrst  generation  family  ﬁrms
(Cabrera-Suárez  and  Santana-Martín,  2004)  these  results  are
somehow  congruent  with  those  obtained  by  García-Ramos
and  García-Olalla  (2011b)  for  public  family  ﬁrms  and  by
Arosa  et  al.  (2010)  and  Maseda  et  al.  (2014)  also  in  the  con-
text  of  Spanish  non-listed  family  ﬁrms.  García-Ramos  and
García-Olalla  (2011b)  and  Arosa  et  al.  (2010)  found  that  out-
side  directors  have  a  positive  effect  on  the  performance  of
family  ﬁrms  but  only  for  those  in  the  ﬁrst  generation.  On
their  part,  Maseda  et  al.  (2014)  found  a  non-linear  inverted
U-shaped  relationship  between  the  proportion  of  outsiders
and  performance,  with  the  optimal  proportion  being  higher
for  ﬁrst  generation  ﬁrms  than  for  second  generation  ones.
It  seems  that  when  there  is  a  powerful  family  Chair/CEO,
outside  directors  are  not  perceived  as  a  threat  and  their
contribution  may  be  perceived  to  be  positive  in  terms  of
knowledge,  experience  and  contacts,  which  could  comple-
ment  the  beneﬁts  provided  by  the  chief  executive  and  the
rest  of  the  management  team.  Speciﬁcally,  earlier  studies
in  closely  held  ﬁrms  suggest  that  outside  directors  could
have  an  important  role  in  improving  strategic  decision  mak-
ing  and  achieving  strategic  change  (e.g.  Bammens  et  al.,
2008;  Brunninge  et  al.,  2007;  Johannisson  and  Huse,  2000;
Voordeckers  et  al.,  2007).  These  change  processes,  and
speciﬁcally  succession,  can  be  particularly  difﬁcult  for  the
family  ﬁrms  in  ﬁrst  generation  due  to  their  lack  of  expe-
rience,  and  this  can  give  a  higher  value  to  the  advice
provide  by  the  outside  directors  (Calabrò  and  Mussolino,
2011;  Fiegener  et  al.,  2000).
Finally,  even  though  the  evidence  obtained  does  not
reach  signiﬁcance,  the  results  suggest  that  the  inﬂuence
of  outside  boards  could  turn  positive  when  the  diversity  of
family  directors  grows.  It  seems  that  outside  directors  could
play  a  role  of  balancing  the  interests  of  diverse  family  mem-
bers  and  preventing  speciﬁc  agency  problems  related  to  the
evolution  of  business  families.  Thus,  we  could  agree  with
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uthors  such  as  Bammens  et  al.  (2008)  and  Uhlaner  et  al.
2007a), who  state  that  the  nature  of  the  board’s  role  in
rivately  held  ﬁrms  may  change  over  their  life-cycle.  This
ould  also  be  an  interesting  point  for  future  research.
As  a  general  conclusion,  the  recommendations  on  ‘‘good
overnance’’  usually  found  in  the  general  literature  on  cor-
orate  governance  need  to  be  better  clariﬁed  in  the  case
f  non-listed  family  ﬁrms,  as  suggested  earlier  (e.g.  García-
amos  and  García-Olalla,  2011a;  Lam  and  Lee,  2007;  Lane
t  al.,  2006;  Uhlaner  et  al.,  2007a).  This,  in  turn,  has
elevant  practical  implications  for  the  decisions  on  board
omposition  in  this  type  of  ﬁrms.  One  important  point  is
hat  boards  of  directors  in  private  family  ﬁrms  may  present
 strong  family  inﬂuence  without  damaging  performance.
his  family  inﬂuence  may  be  exerted  through  a  majority  of
amily  directors  (different  from  the  members  of  the  mana-
ement  team)  or  through  a  family  chairman  also  occupying
he  position  of  CEO.  However,  the  combination  of  the  two
ircumstances  (majority  of  family  directors  and  family  CEO
uality)  seems  not  to  be  an  optimal  situation.  It  may  cre-
te  a  decision  making  context  characterized  by  too  much
ndogamy  and  uniformity  of  criteria  that  could  hinder  per-
ormance.  Therefore,  when  there  is  duality,  a  board  with
 majority  of  outside  directors  would  be  preferable.  That
s,  family  commitment,  unity  of  command  and  idiosyncratic
nowledge  of  the  business  should  be  combined  with  exter-
al  advice  and  a  wider  range  of  points  of  view.  However,
iven  the  importance  of  certain  factors  such  as  trust  for
he  functioning  of  private  family  ﬁrms,  it  may  be  advisable
hat  these  outside  directors  should  belong  to  the  category
f  afﬁliates,  as  suggested  in  previous  studies  on  private  fam-
ly  ﬁrms  (e.g.  Arosa  et  al.,  2010).  Afﬁliate  board  members
re  outside  directors  with  business  or  social  ties  to  family
rms  actors  (for  example,  consultants  or  advisers).  These
ies  allow  them  to  develop  trust  bonds  with  members  of
he  owning  family  that  will  make  them  more  effective  in
erforming  the  advisory  task  (Bammens  et  al.,  2011;  Jones
t  al.,  2008).
The  present  study  has  limitations  that  must  be  taken  into
ccount  when  evaluating  the  conclusions  drawn.  On  the  one
and,  no  data  were  available  on  the  ownership  of  the  ﬁrms,
hich  is  a  signiﬁcant  governance  variable.  However,  it  must
e  noted  that  the  study  focuses  on  non-listed  ﬁrms,  in  which
wners  who  are  not  part  of  the  families  controlling  company
anagement  are  infrequent  and  the  ownership  structures
re  very  concentrated  (Cabrera-Suárez  and  Santana-Martín,
004;  Lane  et  al.,  2006).  In  this  situation,  the  variable  of
nterest  could  be  the  distribution  of  ownership  inside  the
amily.  Thus,  future  research  could  aim  to  obtain  data  on
his  issue.
The  criteria  used  to  identify  family  ﬁrms  (mainly  pres-
nce  of  siblings  in  the  boards  or  in  the  management  teams
nd  family  chairman)  imply  that  the  study  is  limited  to  a
peciﬁc  type  of  family  ﬁrm.  It  has  been  argued  that  this
ype  could  be  the  one  that  better  represent  the  typical
amily  ﬁrm.  However,  future  research  could  aim  to  deepen
n  the  identiﬁcation  and  analysis  of  different  categories  of
rivate  family  ﬁrms,  and  the  effects  of  these  differences
n  the  composition  and  functioning  of  the  board  and  other
overnance  mechanisms.
The  cross-sectional  nature  of  the  data  meant  that  tempo-
al  delay  between  the  independent  and  dependent  variables
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ould  not  be  included.  However,  ﬁndings  on  Spanish  listed
amily  ﬁrms  show  that  board  structure  is  quite  stable
García-Ramos  and  García-Olalla,  2011a).  It  can  therefore
e  assumed  that  this  stability  is  even  greater  in  the  case
f  non-listed  family  ﬁrms.  In  any  case,  future  studies  could
ocus  on  obtaining  more  complete  databases  that  include
ata  panels  over  several  years,  or  on  conducting  in-depth
tudies  that  allow  the  relevant  variables  to  be  studied  lon-
itudinally  (Benavides-Velasco  et  al.,  2011).  Also,  due  to  the
imitations  in  our  database  we  could  not  prove  the  robust-
ess  of  our  results  using  other  measures  of  performance
e.g.  ROA)  as  would  be  desirable  (O’Boyle  et  al.,  2012).
n  fact,  future  research  should  try  to  include  multiple  per-
ormance  measures,  particularly  some  that  accounted  for
on-economic  goals,  as  suggested  by  Chrisman  et  al.  (2004).
Similarly,  with  the  data  available  we  could  not  distinguish
etween  outside  directors  who  could  be  considered  totally
ndependent  and  those  that  are  known  as  afﬁliate  direc-
ors.  Thus,  the  directors  we  have  deﬁned  as  outsiders  do  not
elong  to  the  board  of  management  team  or  the  family,  but
hat  does  not  mean  they  are  independent.  These  directors
t
p
s
A
Overview  of  the  empirical  studies  on  the  relationship  of  board  c
Reference  Type  of
family  ﬁrms
Independent  variab
board  composition
Anderson  and  Reeb
(2004)
Public  Fraction  of  indepen
Ratio  of  inside  (fam
independent  direct
Fraction  of  afﬁliate
Arosa  et  al.  (2010)  Private  Fraction  of  outside  
and independent)
Braun  and  Sharma  (2007)  Public  CEO  duality  
García-Ramos  and
García-Olalla  (2011a)
Public  Proportion  of  indep
Internal  ownership
García-
Ramos
and
García-
Olalla
(2011b)
Public
Proportion  of  indep
CEO duality  
Klein  et  al.  (2005)  Public  Index  of  board  com
(independence)
Lam  and  Lee  (2007)  Public  CEO  duality  
Leung  et  al.  (2014)  Public  Board  independenc
Maseda  et  al.  (2014)  Private  Proportion  of  outsid
Prabowo  and  Simpson
(2011)
Public  Fraction  of  indepenM.K.  Cabrera-Suárez,  J.D.  Martín-Santana
ould  have  some  type  of  professional  or  social  link  with  fam-
ly  members  and/or  the  ﬁrm.  Future  lines  of  investigation
ould  make  that  distinction  and  clarify  if  outside  directors
n  private  family  ﬁrms  should  be  totally  independent  or  if  a
ertain  degree  of  afﬁliation  is  advisable  to  improve  trust
nd  collaboration  between  family  members,  as  has  been
uggested  in  the  literature  (Bammens  et  al.,  2011).
Lastly,  the  inﬂuence  of  boards  of  directors  on  com-
any  performance  cannot  be  understood  only  in  terms  of
oard  composition.  Aspects  associated  with  the  dynam-
cs  that  occur  within  a  board  must  also  be  taken  into
ccount  (Huse,  2000).  In  this  sense,  a  behavioral  approach
hould  be  adopted  in  the  study  of  boards  that  focuses
n  decision-making  processes  and  the  problems  of  coor-
ination,  exploration  and  knowledge  management  (van
es  et  al.,  2009).  In  this  respect,  future  research  adopt-
ng  methodologies  that  allow  in-depth  analysis  of  these
ynamics  would  be  advisable.  In  studies  of  this  type,  the
heoretical  framework  related  to  the  concept  of  familiness,
articularly  in  terms  of  its  association  with  the  concept  of
ocial  capital,  could  be  particularly  relevant.ppendix 1.
omposition  and  performance  in  family  ﬁrms.
le  in  relation  to Relationship  with  performance
dent  directors
ily)  directors  to
ors
 directors
Positive  for  the  fraction  of
independent  directors
Inverted  U-shaped  for  the  ratio  of
family  directors  to  independent
directors
Negative  for  afﬁliate  directors
directors  (afﬁliate Positive  for  the  fraction  of  afﬁliate
directors
Positive  for  the  fraction  of
independent  directors  but  only  for
ﬁrms  in  ﬁrst  generation
Relationship  moderated  by  the  level
of family  ownership
endent  directors Negative  for  the  proportion  of
independent  directors
Inverted  U-shaped  for  internal
ownership
endent  directors  Positive  for  ﬁrms  run  by  their
founders
Negative  for  ﬁrms  run  by  descendants
No  effect  for  ﬁrms  run  by  their
founders
Positive  for  ﬁrms  run  by  descendants
position Negative
Negative
e  Non-signiﬁcant
ers  Inverted  U-shaped
dent  directors  Non-signiﬁcant
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Appendix  1  (Continued)
Reference  Type  of
family  ﬁrms
Independent  variable  in  relation  to
board  composition
Relationship  with  performance
San  Martin-Reyna  and
Duran-Encalada  (2012)
Public  Number  of  independent  directors,
shareholder  directors  and  afﬁliate
directors
Negative  for  independent  directors
Positive  for  shareholder  and  afﬁliate
directors
Schulze  et  al.  (2001)  Private  Percentage  of  outside  directors  Negative
Villalonga  and  Amit
(2006)
Public  Proportion  of  independent  directors  Non-signiﬁcant
Westhead  and  Howorth
(2006)
Private Proportion  of  family  directors Non-signiﬁcant
Yeh  and  Woidtke  (2005) Public  Board  afﬁliation Negative
Appendix 2.
Robustness  check:  results  of  multiple  linear  hierarchical  regression  models.
Independent
variables
Model  I Model  II  Model  III  Model  IV
Standardized
beta
coefﬁcients
t  Standardized
beta
coefﬁcients
t  Standardized
beta
coefﬁcients
t  Standardized
beta
coefﬁcients
t
Constant  −0.904  −0.021  0.064  −0.158
LNAGE 0.074  1.595  0.051  1.103  0.066  1.417  0.057  1.217
LNSIZE −0.066  −1.408  −0.076  −1.608  −0.087  −1.846* −0.073  −1.554
DUAL 0.159  3.095*** 0.110  2.054** 0.155  3.011***
PEXECDIR  −0.156  −2.887*** −0.147  −2.742*** −0.153  −2.831***
MAJOUTDIR  −0.103  −2.061** −0.232  −3.437*** −0.034  −0.457
DIVFAMDIR −0.050  −1.026  −0.054  −1.111  −0.041  −0.828
DUAL*MAJOUTDIR  0.189  2.820***
DIVFAMDIR*
MAJOUTDIR
−0.090  −1.299
Corrected R2 0.005  0.031  0.046  0.033
F 2.180  3.472*** 4.158*** 3.222***
R2 0.034  0.016  0.004
F 4.089*** 7.950*** 1.688
* p < 0.1.
**
B
B
B
B
Bp < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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